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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORANGETOWN POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NOS. U-25534 & 
U-25733 
- and -
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN, 
Respondent. 
BUNYAN & BAUMGARTNER LLP (JOSEPH P. BAUMGARTNER of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
KEANE & BEANE, P.C. (LANCE H. KLEIN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Orangetown Policemen's 
Benevolent Association (PBA) to two decisions1 of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its improper practice charges alleging that the Town of Orangetown (Town) 
violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it refused to provide certain information that the PBA requested to defend disciplinary 
charges filed by the Town against two unit employees, Lorraine Wetzel (U-25534) and 
Ennio Munno (U-25733). 
The ALJ dismissed both charges, finding that the employees' disciplinary rights 
were limited to those available under the Rockland County Police Act, based upon 
1
 As both Case Nos. U-25534 and U-25733 deal with the same substantive issues, we 
have consolidated them for decision. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, -
-and- CASE NO. C-5570 
EAST ROCKAWAY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the a 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
"l 
Certification - C-5570 - 2 -
Included: All regularly scheduled full and part-time Monitors, Cooks and Food 
Service Workers. 
Excluded: Cook Manager, substitute Food Service Workers and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, ITIIS.ORDEREDLthat the^  aboveLnamed_puhlic.employerishall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 7, 2006 
Albany, New York 
^^l/iA^c^^x+JO-' 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 118, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5585 
VILLAGE OF CLYDE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 118, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5585 - 2 -
Included: All full-time employees in the Highway, Water and Sewer 
Departments, full-time Water/Sewer Clerk, and full-time Police 
Department Clerk. 
Excluded: Mayor, Village Clerk, Highway Superintendent, Police Chief, Police 
Officers. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 118, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 7, 2006 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
Board - U-25534 & U-25733 -2 
Orangetown Policemen's Benevolent Association v Town of Orangetown2 In that case, 
the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the disciplinary procedures for unit 
employees were governed by the Rockland County Police Act and not the procedure 
set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between the Town and the PBA. The 
ALJ further found that the PBA had no entitlement under the Act to the information it 
sought, based upon the Board's decision in County of Ulster (hereafter, Ulster)3 
EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA excepts to the ALJ's decisions, arguing that the holding in Ulster has 
been superseded by subsequent Board decisions and is no longer valid law, that the 
Rockland County Police Act does not preclude the Town from providing the requested 
information, and that the demand for information was sufficiently grounded in the 
collective bargaining agreement to require the Town under the Act to provide the 
information sought by the PBA. The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decisions of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decisions and are repeated here only as 
necessary to decide the issues raised by the exceptions.4 
In 2002, Munno, a police officer, was charged by the Town with violating certain 
Town Police Department rules and regulations. Pursuant to Article 15 of the PBA-Town 
218 AD3d 879 (2d Dept 2005). For subsequent history, see note 7, infra. 
3
 26 PERB H3008(1993). 
4
 39 PERB H4502 (2006) and 39 PERB 1J4524 (2006). 
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collective bargaining agreement, an arbitration hearing was scheduled.5 The PBA 
requested certain information from the Town, both by subpoena and discovery, and by 
requests made pursuant to §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. When the Town refused to comply 
with the requests made pursuant to the Act, the charge in Case No. U-25733 was filed 
by the PBA. 
In 2004, Wetzel, a police officer, was charged by the Town with numerous 
violations of Department rules and regulations. The PBA requested information from the 
Town that the PBA asserted was necessary to defend the charges. The Town did not 
respond. The PBA thereafter filed the improper practice charge in Case No. U-25534. 
Section 7 of the Rockland County Police Act (L 1936, Ch 526) provides, in 
relevant part: 
The town board shall have the power and authority to adopt and 
make rules and regulations for the examination, hearing, investigation 
and determination of charges, made or preferred against any member 
or members of such police department. Except as otherwise provided 
by law, no member or members of such police department shall be 
fined, reprimanded, removed or dismissed until written charges shall 
have been examined, heard and investigated in such manner or by 
such procedure, practice, examination and investigation as the board, 
by rules and regulations from time to time, may prescribe. 
DISCUSSION 
In Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York v NYS Public 
Employment Relations Board,6 the Court of Appeals held that bargaining under the Act 
is required over disciplinary procedures unless there is State legislation that specifically 
commits the power to discipline police to local officials. The Rockland County Police Act 
5
 Article 15 prescribes detailed procedures, culminating in arbitration, for any dispute 
concerning the discipline or discharge of Town of Orangetown police officers. 
6
 _ N Y 3 d _ , 2006 Slip Op 02288, 2006 NY Lexis 584, 39 PERB 1J7006 (March 28, 
2006). 
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is such legislation. After the date of the ALJ's decisions in these cases, the Court of 
Appeals decided Town of Orangetown v Orangetown Policemen's Benevolent 
Association7 In that decision, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division 
and held that the Rockland County Police Act is a special law that pre-dated CSL §76(4) 
and that matters of police discipline are within the power and authority of the 
Orangetown Town Board. The Court, therefore, found that Article 15 of the Town-PBA 
collective bargaining agreement was invalid. In reaching its decision, the Court of 
Appeals considered the following question: 
Is there a public policy strong enough to justify excluding police 
discipline from collective bargaining? It might be thought this 
question could be answered yes or no, but the relevant statutes and 
case law are not so simple. In general, the procedures for 
disciplining public employees, including police officers, are governed 
by Civil Service Law §§75 and 76, which provide for a hearing and 
an appeal. In Auburn, a case involving police discipline, 
the Appellate Division rejected the argument that these statutes 
should be interpreted to prohibit collective bargaining agreements 
"that would supplement, modify or replace" their provisions (62 
A.D.2d at 15), and we adopted the Appellate Division's opinion (46 
N.Y.2d at 1035). Thus, where Civil Service Law §§75 and 76 apply, 
police discipline may be the subject of collective bargaining. 
But Civil Service Law §76 (4) says that sections 75 and 76 shall not 
"be construed to repeal or modify" pre-existing laws, and among the 
laws thus grandfathered are several that, in contrast to sections 75 
and 76, provide expressly for the control of police discipline by local 
officials in certain communities. Such laws are applicable in . . . the 
Town of Orangetown . . . . 
Therefore, Wetzel's and Munno's disciplinary rights are limited to those available 
under the Rockland County Police Act. The Rockland County Police Act has no 
procedure for the production of information to a police officer's representative. 
Based upon our decision in Ulster, the ALJ also found that the PBA was not 
entitled, under the Act, to the requested information. That case dealt with an improper 
2006 NY Lexis 584, 2006 NY Slip Op 2288 (March 28, 2006). 
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practice charge alleging that a refusal to produce information to an employee 
organization for defense of a CSL §75 disciplinary charge violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) 
of the Act. The charge was dismissed by the Board, based upon a finding that: 
...there is no obligation under the Act to provide information 
concerning CSL §75 litigation. A union's entitlement to information 
under the Act derives from its right and obligation to represent unit 
employees in the negotiations for, and the administration of, collective 
bargaining agreements. Effective representation for such purposes 
requires access to necessary and relevant information. CSL §75 is a 
statutory procedure pursuant to which certain public employees are 
provided procedural due process prior to the implementation of 
disciplinary action. The CSL §75 procedures are separate and 
independent of the obligation to negotiate under the Act. While CSL 
§75 specifically affords an employee a right to representation by an 
attorney or a representative of a certified or recognized employee 
organization, such representation in that statutory proceeding is for 
purposes of litigation, not collective bargaining. Thus, we find that the 
entitlement to information in the context of a statutory proceeding such 
as CSL §75, if any, derives from the rights attendant to those 
proceedings, not the Act. (at 3015 -16) 
The PBA argues that Ulster is no longer valid in light of our decision in New York 
City Transit Authority8 In that case, we determined that the employer violated §209-
a.1(a) of the Act when it denied a unit employee's request for union representation at an 
investigatory interview that the employee reasonably believed might result in 
discipline. The PBA argues that such a right to representation in a disciplinary 
investigative interview establishes a concomitant duty on the part of the employee 
organization to provide representation to employees facing disciplinary charges and a 
right to obtain the information necessary to provide such representation. The PBA's 
logic is faulty: a public employee's right to representation does not carry with it an 
absolute obligation on the part of an employee organization to provide such 
8
 35 PERB 1J3029 (2002), affd sub nom Matter of New York City Transit Auth v New 
York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 196 Misc2d 532, 36 PERB 1J7009 (Sup Ct Kings 
County 2003), affd 27 AD3d 11, 38 PERB 1J7019 (2d Dept 2005), application forlv 
pending, _NY3d _ (2006). 
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representation. As we have frequently noted: an employee organization does not violate 
the Act by failing to institute an action on the behalf of a unit employee or by failing to 
provide representation to a unit employee, unless the failure to represent the employee 
was due to arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith reasons.9 Employees facing disciplinary 
charges in CSL §§75 or 76 proceedings are entitled to legal representation during those 
proceedings; such entitlement, however, does not carry with it a right to obtain 
information from the employer that is enforceable under the Act. Our decision in New 
York City Transit Authority, supra, does not change our holding in Ulster and we here 
reiterate that there is no Taylor Law right to information in conjunction with a statutory 
proceeding in which a union may be providing representation to a unit employee. 
In support of its exceptions, the PBA argues that our decision in Town of Evans™ 
holds that a union is entitled to information in connection with its representation of an 
employee in a CSL §§75 or 76 proceeding and that the same relief is appropriate here. 
That case, however, unlike the instant cases and Ulster, dealt with a contractual 
disciplinary procedure that was adopted in lieu of CSL §§75 and 76 procedures. Having 
filed a disciplinary grievance pursuant to the contractually provided procedure protesting 
the employee's discharge, we found that the union was entitled under the Act to "the 
disclosure of information relevant to a grievance prior to arbitration." (at 3050) The 
instant cases are governed by the Rockland County Police Act and, thus, involve 
charges brought pursuant to a statutory non-contractual disciplinary procedure, 
9
 See CSEA v Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other 
grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). See also Phillip L. Maier, The Taylor 
Law and the Duty of Fair Representation, 53-55 (2002) and the cases cited therein on a 
union's obligation or lack thereof to represent employees in actions unrelated to the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
10
 37 PERB H3016(2004). 
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therefore, our holding in Town of Evans, supra, does not apply. 
Therefore, the Town's refusal to provide information requested by the PBA in 
conjunction with Wetzel's and Munno's disciplinary charges does not violate §§209-
a. 1(a) and (d) of the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the PBA's exceptions and we affirm the 
decisions of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges in U-25534 and U-25733 are 
dismissed in their entirety. 
DATED: June 7, 2006 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
i^^WX^^^^e^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ULSTER COUNTY SHERIFF EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, CWA, LOCAL 1105, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-25697 
- and -
COUNTY OF ULSTER AND ULSTER COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
SPIVAK, LIPTON, WATANABE, SPIVAK, MOSS & ORFAN LLP (NICOLE 
CUDA PEREZ of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENS of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Ulster County Sheriff 
Employees Association, CWA, Local 1105, AFL-CIO (Association) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that 
the County of Ulster and Ulster County Sheriff (Employer) violated §209-a.1 (a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused a unit employee's request 
Board - U-25697 -2 
to have a union representative present while being questioned by a superior officer, in 
violation of his Weingarten^ rights. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in applying the law 
and erred in assessing the credibility of the witnesses, thereby rendering the decision 
arbitrary and capricious. The Employer filed a response in support of the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision and adopted by the Board.2 
The Association filed an improper practice charge on February 11, 2005, 
alleging, in substance, that on December 30, 2004, Corporal Paul Wesolowski met with 
Sergeant Charles Polacco, at Polacco's invitation, in the presence of Sergeant Michael 
McGirr. Polacco questioned Wesolowski about what time he left work the day before. 
Wesolowski allegedly asked for and was refused a union representative. 
1
 In National Labor Relations Board v Weingarten, 420 US 251 (1975), the Supreme 
Court held that an employee has a statutory right to refuse to submit without union 
representation, once requested, to an interview which he/she reasonably fears may 
result in his discipline. While the Association used the term "Weingarten rights", it was 
clear that it meant to assert the rights accorded to public employees under §202 of the 
Act, as found by the Board in New York City Transit Auth, 35 PERB 1J7012 (2002), affd 
sub nom, Matter of New York City Transit Auth v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 196 
Misc2d 532, 36 PERB 1J7009 (Sup Ct Kings County 2003), affd 27 AD3d 11, 38 PERB 
1J7019 (2d Dept 2005), Iv denied AD3d , 39 PERB 1J7003 (2006), motion for 
leave pending. 
2
 39 PERB H4533 (2006). 
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The Association further alleges that, on January 4, 2005, the Employer served 
Wesolowski with charges of insubordination at the December 30, 2004 meeting and 
misconduct for leaving work early on December 29, 2004. Wesolowski served a 30-day 
suspension. 
The Association called Wesolowski and Correction Officer Brian Lyons in support 
of its charge. On direct examination, Wesolowski testified that Polacco asked him why 
he left work early on December 29, 2004. Wesolowski denied leaving early and, from 
the tone of Polacco's voice, he stated that he was under the impression that Polacco 
was going to have him charged with leaving work early. Since Polacco persisted with 
the same question, Wesolowski requested union representation. Wesolowski testified 
on cross-examination that he could not recall whether Polacco said that the meeting 
was not a counseling session. 
Correction Officer Brian Lyons testified on behalf of the Association that he was 
standing outside of the office and could overhear the conversation between Wesolowski 
and Polacco. Lyons recalled that Wesolowski requested union representation. 
Sergeant McGirr testified on behalf of the Employer. Mc Girr, the Association 
Treasurer, was already seated in Polacco's office when Wesolowski came in and 
observed the conversation between Wesolowski and Polacco. McGirr stated that he 
recalled Polacco telling Wesolowski that "he was not there to counsel him."3 McGirr 
described how Wesolowski became agitated and was about to leave the room when 
Polacco informed him that, if he left the room, he would be insubordinate. McGirr 
3
 Transcript, p. 91. 
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testified that interrogations that lead to disciplinary charges are conducted by either 
Internal Affairs Division or the Detective Division. 
Polacco testified that the purpose of meeting with Wesolowski was simply to 
determine whether everything was all right at home. If there were no problems that 
caused Wesolowski to leave early, then Polacco wanted to review the time clock policy 
with him. He insisted that the meeting was not intended as a counseling session. 
Polacco testified that Wesolowski never asked for a union representative. Polacco 
stated that disciplinary investigations are conducted by either the Detective Division or 
Internal Affairs Division. Although he conceded on cross-examination that he discussed 
Wesolowski's conduct during his meeting with either the warden or Superintendent 
Ebel, the written memo4 he sent Ebel did not include events of December 29, 2004, 
when Wesolowski allegedly left work early without permission. 
DISCUSSION 
The Association contends in its exceptions that the ALJ erred on the law by 
applying an arbitrary standard in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and 
misstating the law as it relates to discipline for insubordination when union 
representation has been wrongfully withheld. 
It is axiomatic that, in an improper practice proceeding, the charging party has 
the burden of proof.5 The Association has alleged a violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act 
in that the employer has interfered with, restrained or coerced a public employee in the 
4
 Respondent's Exhibit 1. 
5
 See Civ Serv Employees Assn v Cuevas, 21A AD2d 930, 33 PERB 1J7012 (3d Dept 
2000). 
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exercise of his rights guaranteed in §202 of the Act. We recently extended the 
principles of §202 to include the right of a public employee to request a union 
representative during an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably 
believes may result in discipline.6 
In a recent decision,7 we articulated the test to be used to determine the 
reasonableness of an employee's belief that an investigatory interview may result in 
discipline. We concluded that "[i]n testing the reasonableness of an employee's belief, 
we use a reasonable person standard. 'An employee's fear is reasonable if the 
interview is calculated to form the basis for taking discipline or other job-affecting 
actions against such employee because of past misconduct' or 'incompetence'." 
(footnote omitted). Here, Wesolowski testified that it was his impression that Polacco 
wanted to have him charged with leaving early. The circumstances then, were such 
that Wesolowski's concerns were reasonable. 
The ALJ, however, concluded that it was as likely as not that Wesolowski 
requested that a union representative be present during the meeting. Since the 
evidence rested upon the conflicting testimony of the witnesses, the ALJ based his 
decision on the credibility of the witnesses. In doing so, the ALJ considered certain 
factors, including their demeanor, tone, directness of their answers and the fact that the 
6
 New York City Transit Auth, supra note 1. 
7
 New York City Transit Auth, 36 PERB 1J3049, at 3143-4 (2003), confd sub nom 
Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100, AFL-CIO v Pub EmpI Relations Bd, 24 
AD3d 224, 38 PERB 1J7018 (1st Dept 2005). 
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witnesses were sequestered. The ALJ also considered the interest or bias of 
Wesolowski and Polacco. 
In Fashion Institute of Technology v Helsby,8 the Appellate Division held that 
"[t]he determination of the hearing officer rested on a weighing of the credibility of the 
testimony adduced. In such a case, the findings of the hearing officer as trier of fact 
should be given the greatest weight." 
The Association argues in its brief that the ALJ's assessment of the credibility of 
Polacco and McGirr was arbitrary and capricious. The Association contends that the 
ALJ discounted Polacco's testimony because of his status as a supervisor and union 
officer, but, at the same time, credited McGirr's testimony. The Association's argument 
misapprehends the ALJ's analysis. McGirr's testimony was not credited merely 
because of his supervisory status and union office. The uncontradicted evidence 
demonstrated that McGirr was merely a disinterested observer who happened to be in 
the office with Wesolowski and Polacco at the time of the discussion. There is no 
record evidence that Polacco invited McGirr to be a witness. Furthermore, as a union 
officer, Wesolowski proffered no evidence to establish bias or a conflict of interest which 
might affect the weight of McGirr's testimony. We find, therefore, that there is 
substantial evidence in the record that establishes Wesolowski did not request union 
representation during the interview with Polacco. As there was no request for 
representation, there could be no violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. 
44 AD2d 550, 7 PERB 1J7005 at 7009 (1st Dept 1974). 
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Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: June 7, 2006 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
1-UoCUuJ7-^X^-^L^-
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PLUMBERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1, 
UA, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-25883 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
BROACH & STULBERG (JOSHUA S.C. PARKHURST of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
DANIEL McCRAY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (KAREN SOLIMANDO of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Plumbers Local Union No. 1, 
UA, AFL-CIO (Union) and the Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the Union. The Union alleged that the District violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
transferred work performed by employees in the bargaining unit represented by the 
Union to employees of a private contractor, Strategic Distribution, Inc. (SDI); when it 
Case No. U-25883 -2 
failed to respond to the Union's demand to negotiate its decision to privatize unit work; 
and when it likewise failed to respond to the Union's request for information regarding 
its decision to privatize the work previously performed by bargaining unit members. 
Pursuant to the District's motion to dismiss at the close of the Union's direct 
case, the ALJ dismissed the charge as to the alleged unilateral assignment of unit work, 
finding it to be untimely. The ALJ also dismissed the refusal to negotiate allegation, 
finding that the Union had failed to demonstrate that the work transferred was exclusive 
bargaining unit work. However, the ALJ found that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act by refusing the Union's request for information. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Union excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of certain aspects of its improper 
practice charge, specifically the ALJ's determination that the unilateral change 
allegations are time-barred and that the Union had not established exclusivity over the 
in-issue bargaining unit work. The District excepts to the ALJ's finding that it violated the 
Act by not supplying the Union with the requested information pertaining to the 
privatization of bargaining unit work. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse and remand this case to the ALJ. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
The hearing was adjourned at the end of the Union's direct case so that the ALJ 
could consider the District's motion to dismiss. Therefore, pursuant to our decision in 
Case No. U-25883 -3 
County of Nassau (Unterweiser),1 in assessing the record evidence, we must "assume 
the truth of all the charging party's evidence and give the charging party the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from those assumed facts" and must 
reverse the granting of a motion to dismiss "unless we could conclude that the evidence 
produced by the charging party, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, is plainly 
insufficient even in the absence of any rebuttal by the respondent to warrant a finding 
that the charge should be sustained". 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision.2 Additional facts are set forth below 
in order to address the exceptions. 
The record testimony consists solely of the Union's two witnesses: Frank 
Podmore, a unit employee and Union shop steward, and Tom Kempf, an organizer for 
the Union. The Union represents plumbers, plumbers' helpers and plumber supervisors 
employed by the District, either performing plumbing duties at various District properties 
or working at plumbing supply shops located in each borough of New York City. The 
record evidence shows that unit employees working at the plumbing supply shop 
located at 4435 Vernon Boulevard in Queens took orders, retrieved tools and materials 
from the stock room, fabricated materials, packaged items, completed tracking forms, 
entered information into the computers, filled out various forms and stocked shelves. In 
June or August 2004, the District introduced an SDI employee into the shop for two 
1
 17 PERB H3013, at 3030 (1984). 
2
 39 PERB H4527 (2006). 
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days to monitor the operation. In September 2004, the District advised unit employees 
at the supply shop to turn their keys to the stockroom over to SDI employees so they 
could inventory the stock. Podmore, a plumber working in the shop, informed Kempf at 
that time that nonunit employees were going through the stockroom and questioned 
whether unit employees were required to work with them. Kempf told Podmore that he 
had to work with whomever he was assigned to work with. The District did not inform 
any employees at the shop of the nature of the work being performed by the SDI 
employees or the duration of their tenure in the shop, beyond the fact that they would be 
performing the stockroom function. Unit employees continued the work of entering 
orders and adjusting inventory on the shop's computers, but SDI employees began 
filling the orders from the stockroom. 
In December 2004, Podmore testified that the unit employees at the shop were 
informed by the District that they were going out into the field and that there would be no 
more unit employees assigned to the shop. In April 2005, the unit employees were 
removed from the shop and given field assignments by the District. 
Kempf testified that in December 2004, Podmore informed him that the unit 
employees were being removed from the shop and the work at the shop was going to 
be done by SDI. Kempf informed the Union's lawyer and, in a letter dated December 30, 
2004, the Union demanded bargaining over the District's decision to subcontract the 
work performed by unit employees in the shop and requested information from the 
District regarding the subcontracting so as to be able to conduct negotiations on the 
subject. The District did not respond to the Union. The District neither informed the 
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Union of its decision to subcontract unit work nor negotiated with the Union over its 
decision nor provided the Union with any of the requested information. 
The District moved to dismiss the improper practice charge, as to the unilateral 
assignment of unit work to nonunit employees, at the close of the Union's direct case. 
The District argued that the charge, filed on April 21, 2005, was untimely because the 
Union knew that unit work was being assigned to SDI in September 2004. The ALJ 
adjourned the hearing and requested briefs on the motion to dismiss. The ALJ 
thereafter additionally confirmed, in a letter to the parties, that the District did not 
respond to the Union's December 30, 2004 demand to negotiate and its request for 
information and that the District's position was that it had no legal obligation to do so. 
The ALJ also stated that the District had no further evidence on those issues. 
DISCUSSION 
As noted previously, in deciding a motion to dismiss, we must assume the truth 
of all the Union's evidence and give the Union every reasonable inference from those 
assumed facts. On this record, therefore, we cannot find that the Union had notice of 
the assignment of unit work at the shop to SDI employees until December 2004. 
Podmore's testimony that he knew there were SDI employees working in the stockroom 
in September 2004, but he did not know the extent of their work or the duration of their 
assignment, is insufficient to impute notice to the Union that bargaining unit work was 
being assigned to nonunit employees. "The employee organization, or its leadership, 
must have knowledge of the act that constitutes the improper practice charge for it to be 
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held to have notice, upon which timeliness determinations may be based."3 This record 
does not establish that Podmore, as a shop steward, was empowered to bind the Union 
to notice of the assignment in September 2004. This would be the case even if we 
could find that the assignment of the stockroom work to SDI employees, as set forth on 
this record, was sufficiently unequivocal to constitute an announcement of the District's 
plan.4 Likewise, we do not find that Podmore's inquiry to Kempf in September 2004 was 
sufficient notice to the Union of the privatization of bargaining unit work. The Union was 
not "reasonably positioned to know" of the unilateral assignment of unit work at the shop 
based on that one call from Podmore.5 On the record thus far, the charge as related to 
the unilateral assignment of unit work to SDI employees, as announced by the District in 
December 2004 may not be dismissed as untimely.6 We remand the matter to the ALJ 
to take more evidence on this issue. 
3
 Cold Spring Harbor Cent Sch Dist, 36 PERB H3016, at 3048 (2003), confirmed sub 
nom., Matter of Cold Spring Harbor Teachers Assn v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 12 
AD3d 443, 37 PERB 1J7009 (2d dept 2004). See also County of Nassau, 23 PERB 
1J3051 (1990). 
4
 Cold Spring Harbor, supra, where we found that the fact that the union president was 
aware of the hiring of nonunit employees was not sufficient notice of the unilateral 
assignment of unit work to nonunit employees where the president was not aware of the 
exact nature of the duties being assigned to the nonunit employees. See also County of 
Cattauraugus, 8 PERB 1J3062 (1975), holding that an employer must give notice to the 
certified or recognized bargaining agent of a change in terms and conditions of 
employment and that notice to the affected employees does not discharge this 
obligation. 
5
 See Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES, 27 PERB 1J3014 (1994). 
6
 Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a). 
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The unilateral subcontract of unit work is itself a rejection of the bargaining 
process and a refusal to bargain. No demand to bargain is necessary in such 
circumstance.7 A demand to bargain is necessary only as to those §209-a.1(d) 
allegations which are grounded upon a refusal to bargain pursuant to a specific 
demand. A refusal to bargain premised upon a unilateral change in a mandatory subject 
of negotiation is a violation of the Act separate from a refusal to bargain pursuant to 
demand.8 The ALJ's finding that there is no obligation to negotiate upon demand about 
an action which is the subject of an "untimely" charge alleging a unilateral change is in 
error. The obligation to negotiate a mandatory subject upon demand is different and 
separate from the allegation of a unilateral change, even if both are based upon the 
same underlying action, as long as there has been a separate demand to negotiate. 
Based upon the record evidence at the time the motion to dismiss was made, the 
Union had established a prima facie case that the work performed by unit employees at 
the shop was exclusive bargaining unit work. Podmore's testimony is that unit 
employees exclusively performed work in the shop.9 We, therefore, find that the ALJ 
erred in granting the motion to dismiss the alleged refusal by the District to negotiate in 
good faith for lack of exclusivity by the Union over the work sought to be bargained. We 
' Wappingers Cent Sch Dist, 19 PERB 1J3037 (1986); County of Cattauraugus, supra, 
note 5. 
8
 Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre, 18 PERB 1J3082 (1985); County of 
Schenectady and Sheriff, 18 PERB 1J3038 (1985). 
9
 The District's allegations in its exceptions that the work was never exclusively the 
Union's work or had been previously reassigned to SDI employees in other shops 
operated by the District are argument and are not record facts. 
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remand the matter to the ALJ to complete the hearing on this issue by hearing the 
District's case and any rebuttal thereto. 
As to the violation of §209-a.1 (d) found by the ALJ, that the District failed to 
respond to the Union's request for information which it required to bargain the decision 
to subcontract, we reserve decision. The District has raised arguments in its exceptions 
that cannot be addressed based on the evidence in the record at the time of the motion 
to dismiss. The District may renew its exceptions to this portion of the ALJ's decision 
after it has presented evidence on this point. 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant the Union's exceptions, reserve decision on 
the District's exception, and reverse the ALJ's rulings on timeliness, exclusivity and 
refusal to bargain. We remand the case to the ALJ for the presentation of the District's 
case and the Union's rebuttal, if any, of that evidence. 
For the reasons set forth above, the case is remanded to the ALJ for further 
proceedings consistent with our decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 7, 2006 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Alice Altieri to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her improper practice charge which alleged 
that AFSCME, Council 66, Local 3933 (AFSCME) failed to file a grievance on her behalf 
and thereby breached its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the 
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Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Both the employer, Albany Public 
Library (Library),1 and AFSCME filed answers denying the allegations of the charge. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Altieri alleges that the ALJ erred on the facts. The Library's response to the 
exceptions contends that the ALJ's decision is supported by the facts and the law and 
that the charge is, in any event, moot. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision2 and are herein adopted by the 
Board. 
Altieri's charge stems from the Library's request for a release of medical records 
in order to address Altieri's July 2004 request for reasonable accommodation pursuant 
to the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).. The Library requested a meeting 
on May 11, 2005 with Altieri. Altieri's charge states that AFSCME's Local Vice 
President, Joseph Burke, assisted her at the meeting, held on May 11, 2005, to discuss 
the medical release. AFSCME thereafter determined that the Library acted within its 
prerogative under the ADA and further, did not violate the terms of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement. 
1
 The Library is a joined as party to the charge, pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
2
 39 PERB H4545 (2006). 
Board - U-26097 -3 
In a letter dated January 27, 2006, the ALJ wrote the parties in an attempt to 
narrow the legal and factual issues. In that letter, the ALJ advised the parties that the 
details of the charge failed to establish a violation of the Act. However, the ALJ 
provided Altieri with an opportunity to submit further documentation by February 14, 
2006, in the form of "a written statement so indicating and setting forth the provisions of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement claimed to have been violated and whether 
her request(s) to the bargaining agency included identification of provision(s) she claims 
to have been violated." 
Altieri's February 10, 2006 submission, responding to the ALJ's letter, lists the 
preamble to the parties' collective bargaining agreement and a nondiscrimination clause 
found in Article II of that agreement. Altieri's submission also alleged that the AFSCME 
Executive Board failed to meet on her grievance request. 
In response to Altieri's submission, the Library alleged that she merely repeated 
the allegations of her charge, and alleged that it "did not file a grievance because 
grounds to substantiate such a grievance never existed" because the Library did not 
violate or improperly apply the collective bargaining agreement. AFSCME also contends 
that Altieri failed to inform it of what collective bargaining agreement articles were 
allegedly violated as her original e-mail to Burke on May 23, 2005 simply referenced the 
AFSCME Steward Handbook. 
DISCUSSION 
In order to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation, a charging party 
must prove that the employee organization acted in a manner that was arbitrary, 
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discriminatory or in bad faith.3 We have consistently held that we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of a union regarding the filing and prosecution of grievances, since a 
union has a wide range of reasonableness in this regard.4 
Here, the underlying basis for Altieri's charge, that the Library discriminated 
against her by requesting a medical release subsequent to her request for reasonable 
accommodation, is unsubstantiated in the record. The charge is fatally defective, 
however, in that it fails to specify how AFSCME acted in an arbitrary manner, 
discriminated against her, or acted in bad faith by failing to file a grievance on her 
behalf. 
Altieri's dissatisfaction with AFSCME's determination that a grievance was not 
warranted does not establish a violation of the Act. Dissatisfaction with an employee 
organization's tactics or strategy in handling a grievance does not establish a violation 
of the Act.5 Altieri's allegation that AFSCME did not meet to discuss her request for 
representation is also without merit. Altieri concedes that AFSCME consulted with her 
and discussed the merits of her complaint before it reached its decision and that she 
was advised of the decision that AFSCME would not pursue the grievance. 
Based on the foregoing, Altieri's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed. 
3
 Civil Service Employees Assn, Inc v PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 
(3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
4
 See District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB 1J3062 (1995). 
5
 Local 1655, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 25 PERB 1J3008 (1992). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 7, 2006 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
